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The Department of State announced on October 16,
2012, that the Agreement between the United States of
America and the Russian Federation Regarding Cooperation in Adoption of Children entered into force on
November 1, 2012. This agreement should enhance the
safeguards and protections for all parties involved in
adoptions between the United States and the Russian
Federation.
The Agreement’s entry into force began a period of
transition that will last six to nine months. Most cases
already in progress as of November 1 will be able to
continue under the old procedures.
The twenty-nine-page Agreement is at Appendix A
and http://tsgsandbox.his.com/adoptions/content/pdf/
usrussia_adoption_agmt-713%2011-signed_english.
pdf. A Frequently Asked Questions set (http://tsgsand
box.his.com/adoptions/content/pdf/Russia_Bilateral_
Adoption_Agreement_FAQs1012.pdf) is reprinted
at Appendix B. Further information on the Agreement
is available at www.uscis.gov/adoption and www.adop
tion.state.gov.

BITS AND PIECES
EOIR — In October the DOJ Office of the Inspector
General issued an eighty-page report, number I-2013-01,
available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2012/
e1301.pdf, indicating that ‘‘The OIG found that immigration court performance reports are incomplete and
overstate the actual accomplishments of these courts.
These flaws in EOIR’s performance reporting preclude
the Department from accurately assessing the courts’
progress in processing immigration cases or identifying
needed improvements.’’ Juan Osuna, Executive Director
(News continued on page 1827)

17 Bender’s Immigration Bulletin

1810

November 15, 2012

EDITORIAL BOARD

CASE DIGESTS IN THIS ISSUE:

Valentine A. Brown
David L. Cleveland
Bruce A. Hake
Daniel C. Horne
Marı́a Pabón López
Stanley Mailman
Kathrin S. Mautino
Cyrus D. Mehta
Michael A. Olivas
Angelo Paparelli
Naomi Schorr
Margaret D. Stock
Alan Tafapolsky
A. James Vázquez-Azpiri
Ronald Wada
Stephen Yale-Loehr

Federal Court Decisions.................................................................................. 1827
 Ali v. Holder (asylum denial on merits)
 Borrome v. Att’y Gen. (conviction under FDCA not controlled-substance one)
 Matul-Hernandez v. Holder (social group)
 Dayo v. Holder (asylum denial on merits; breach of confidentiality)
 Liu v. Mund (affidavit of support beneficiary’s duty to mitigate)
 Dandamudi v. Tisch (discrimination against noncitizen, non-LPR pharmacists)
 Mendoza v. U.S. (delayed filing for coram nobis)
 Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Mgmt. (DOMA)

EDITORIAL STAFF
Michael Bruno
Editorial Director
Ellen M. Flynn
Molly J. Liskow
Legal Editors,
Practice Area Content
Sue Asher Siler
Research Editor

BIA Decisions ................................................................................................... 1830
Precedent:
 Matter of Sanchez-Herbert (termination of proceedings)
 Matter of Davey (meaning of ‘‘single offense’’ in personal-use exception)
AAO Decisions ................................................................................................. 1831
 Matter of X (extraordinary-ability I-140 for M.I.T. professor-scientist)
 Matter of X (extraordinary-ability I-140 for software engineer)
 Matter of X (extraordinary-ability I-140 for educator-activist)
 Matter of X (MTR procedural failures)
 Matter of X (untimely appeal from extraordinary-ability I-140 denial)
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS IN THIS ISSUE:
Federal Register ............................................................................................. 1834
 DHS; designation of Taiwan for Visa Waiver Program; final rule
 DOS; repeal of 22 C.F.R. Pt. 52, on consular role in marriages; final rule
 Treasury; OFAC: renaming of Iranian Transactions Regulations; final rule
ICE Memorandum ........................................................................................ 1834
 October 24, 2011, John Morton directive on enforcement actions involving
sensitive locations

The articles in this Bulletin represent the
views of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editorial Board
or Editorial Staff of this Bulletin or of
LexisNexis Matthew Bender.

USCIS Documents ......................................................................................... 1834
 USCIS-AILA Meeting Oct. 9, 2012, minutes
 USCIS Field Ops-AILA Meeting Oct. 4, 2012, minutes

ISBN: 978-1-5791-1707-8 (eBook)

DOL Guidance ............................................................................................... 1834
 TEGL No. 9-12, Human Trafficking: Services and Referrals (Oct. 24, 2012)
DOS Cable ...................................................................................................... 1834
 October 12, 2012, cable on B-1 in Lieu of H-1B or H-3 visa

ON THE COVER: Masthead artwork of Ellis Island, New York Harbor, New York
A NOTE ON CITATION: The correct citation form for this publication is: 17 Bender’s Immigr. Bull. 1811 (Nov. 15, 2012).
This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided
with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal or
other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.
From the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of
Publishers and Associations.

Copyright ß 2012 LexisNexis and the Knowledge Burst logo are registered trademarks and Michie is a trademark of Reed Elsevier Properties
Inc., used under license. Matthew Bender and the Matthew Bender Flame Design are registered trademarks of Matthew Bender Properties Inc.

17 Bender’s Immigration Bulletin

1811

November 15, 2012

EXPERT EVIDENCE IN GENDER-BASED ASYLUM CASES: CULTURAL
TRANSLATION FOR THE COURT
BY

LINDSAY M. HARRIS, ESQ.

This article examines the use of country conditions
experts in gender-based asylum claims, with a focus on
African women and girls facing gender-based violence
in their countries of origin. Using anonymous case
examples from the work of the Tahirih Justice Center’s
African Women’s Empowerment Project, the article
explores the role of experts and the critical bridge that
experts can provide in asylum claims adjudicated at the
asylum office and in immigration court. A brief overview of U.S. asylum law and procedures sets the stage
for a deeper look at expert evidence.
In the context of gender-based asylum claims, experts
often play a pivotal role in explaining gender-based
violence by providing information and opinions on the
political, social, cultural, familial, and economic contexts
for this violence. That country conditions experts add a
great deal to an asylum claim is nothing new, but this
issue has taken on even more critical importance with the
evolution of the law around ‘‘particular social group’’ and
the introduction of the concepts of social visibility and
particularity. This article addresses the role of experts in:
(a) explaining conditions on the ground in the country of
origin and corroborating an applicant’s asylum claim; (b)
providing evidence to establish that persecution was ‘‘on
account of’’ one of the five statutory grounds for persecution (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group); (c) examining
situations in which non-state actors act as persecutors and
in explaining government unwillingness or inability to
protect an applicant from persecution; (d) assessing the
legal structure of the country in question and how that
legal structure intersects with the reality of attitudes
toward certain groups or cultural practices. The article
concludes with practice pointers for both attorneys and
potential expert witnesses in working together to present
gender-based asylum claims in the United States.
I.

INTRODUCTION
a.

Overview of U.S. Asylum Law

Individuals seeking asylum in the United States
must meet the refugee definition codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42) (Immigration and Nationality Act
(‘‘INA’’) § 101(a)(42)), which reads in part:

any person who is outside any country of such
person’s nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself
of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.
An asylum applicant may have suffered persecution in
the past,1 or may face a well founded fear of persecution in
the future. U.S. courts have interpreted persecution to
include: threats of harm or death;2 detention;3 rape;4

1
Asylum may be granted solely based on past persecution
where a future fear does not exist or has been rebutted. This is
often known as ‘‘humanitarian asylum,’’ and under the regulations may be granted due to ‘‘compelling reasons’’ arising out of
the severity of the past persecution or because of a ‘‘reasonable
possibility that he or she may suffer other serious harm’’ upon
removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii); see also Matter of L-S-,
25 I. & N. Dec. 705 (BIA 2012) (remanding to the immigration
judge (‘‘IJ’’) to determine whether the Albanian asylum applicant
faced other serious harm upon return); Matter of S-A-K-, 24 I. &
N. Dec. 464 (BIA 2008) (granting asylum to a Somali mother
and daughter based on the severity of the past persecution in the
form of being subjected to FGM multiple times); Matter of Chen,
20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 20-21 (BIA 1989) (granting asylum to a
respondent who suffered severe past persecution in China and
demonstrated other compelling factors to warrant a favorable
exercise of discretion).
2
Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 126 (4th Cir.
2011) (finding that death threats may constitute persecution
(citing Li v. Gonzalez, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005)));
Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that
verbal death threats may amount to persecution); Baballah v.
Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that
threats even where the applicant has not been beaten or physically harmed can amount to persecution); Chang v. INS, 119
F.3d 1055, 1066 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that threats to life,
confinement, and torture constitute persecution).
3

Phommasoukha v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1011, 1015 (8th
Cir. 2005); Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819,
823 (BIA 1990).
4
Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2000);
Matter of D-V-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 77, 79-80 (BIA 1993).
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severe economic deprivation;5 lack of reproductive
control;6 physical abuse,7 including domestic violence8
and female genital mutilation (‘‘FGM’’);9 forced labor;10
verbal, emotional, or psychological abuse;11 or deprivation of education.12 Courts will also consider a cumulative
analysis of all discriminatory acts to which an individual
has been subjected.13
An applicant’s future fear of persecution must
be subjective, which can be established by the applicant’s credible testimony, and objective, meaning that
a reasonable person in the applicant’s circumstances
would also fear persecution.14 A successful asylum
applicant must prove a reasonable possibility of future
persecution, which may be as low as a one in ten chance
of future persecution.15

5

Matter of T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 170-71 (BIA
2007).
6

Wang v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003);
Matter of Y-T-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 601, 603 (BIA 2003).
7

Chen v. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir. 2004).

8
There is no precedent decision to cite for the proposition that harm in the form of domestic violence constitutes
persecution. Domestic violence often encompasses other
recognized forms of persecution, such as rape and other
physical harm. The Department of Homeland Security briefs
filed in Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R- are instructive as to
the government’s position on asylum claims based on
domestic violence. These briefs are available at http://cgrs.
uchastings.edu/campaigns/alvarado.php and http://cgrs.
uchastings.edu/campaigns/Matter%20of%20LR.php.
9

Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (BIA
1996).
10
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Perhaps the most important aspect of the refugee definition for the purposes of this paper is the requirement that
the past or future persecution was or will be ‘‘on account
of’’ one of the five protected grounds – the individual’s
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. This ‘‘on account of’’ requirement is also referred to as nexus to a statutory ground.
Asylum applicants are required to put forth direct or
circumstantial evidence that their persecutor was or is motivated to harm them by one of the five grounds for asylum.16
It is quite straightforward to imagine the type of
case where someone is persecuted on account of his
or her race or religion, or even his or her nationality,
which is often construed broadly to include ethnicity
and not only citizenship. Persecution on account of
one’s political opinion is also well within the realm of
our collective imagination—indeed, the quintessential
refugee is the political dissident, perhaps an outspoken
opposition party member whom a government seeks to
silence. For this reason, asylum in general is sometimes
referred to as ‘‘political asylum.’’
Persecution on account of membership in a particular
social group, however, takes us into murkier waters, but it
is here that we must dive in. A particular social group
must be united by a ‘‘common immutable characteristic,’’
one that the group members either cannot change or
should not be required to change because it is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience.17 Common
immutable characteristics can include, for example,
gender or sex,18 sexual orientation,19 or kinship or
family ties.20
Additional factors to include in the particular
social group analysis, introduced by the Board of

Lhanzom v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833, 847-49 (7th Cir.

2005).
11
Javhlan v. Holder, 626 F.3d 1119, 1122-23 (9th Cir.
2010); Shoaira v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 2004).
12

Matter of S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (BIA

2000).
13
See, e.g., Baharon v. Holder, 588 F.3d 228, 232 (4th
Cir. 2009); Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir.
1998); Matter of O-Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 23, 26 (BIA 1998).
14

See, e.g., Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir.
2005) (a ‘‘reasonable person in like circumstances would fear
persecution’’).
15

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987).
An application for asylum is also an application for withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3). The Supreme Court has stated that the burden
of proof for withholding is higher than for asylum — withholding requires that an applicant face a threat to his or her life
or freedom that is ‘‘more likely than not,’’ meaning a higher
than 50% chance of such harm. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407,
424 (1984).

16
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992). The
passage of the REAL ID Act in 2005 clarified that the
asylum applicant must show that the statutory ground was
‘‘one central reason’’ for the persecution. The BIA has interpreted this as meaning that the statutory ground ‘‘cannot be
incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another
reason for harm.’’ Matter of J-B-N-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208,
214 (BIA 2007).
17

Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA

1985).
18
Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (BIA
1996); see also Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec at 233.
19

Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822-23
(BIA 1990).
20

See, e.g., Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117,
124-26 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that ‘‘family members of
those who actively oppose gangs in El Salvador by agreeing
to be prosecutorial witnesses’’ was a cognizable social group);
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
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Immigration Appeals (‘‘BIA’’) in 2006 and 2007, are
social visibility21 and particularity.22 Social visibility,
although a confusing term, is properly understood as
the requirement that society in the country in question
perceives that particular social group as a group.23
Particularity requires that the proposed group can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct
that it would be recognized, in the society in question,
as comprising a discrete class of persons.’’24 The
introduction of these two relatively recent concepts,
social visibility and particularity, has made the use
of experts as cultural translators for adjudicators
in asylum cases more critical than ever before.
b. Overview of U.S. Asylum Procedures
The U.S. asylum system divides asylum applications into two basic tracks, affirmative and defensive
asylum.
Affirmative Asylum
First, an applicant may proactively file what is
known as an ‘‘affirmative’’ application for asylum.
The applicant sends in the application for asylum (on
Form I-589) to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, within the Department of Homeland
Security (‘‘DHS’’), and receives an interview conducted
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by staff of one of eight asylum offices nationwide.25
The asylum interview is a non-adversarial process
whereby an asylum officer interviews the applicant to
assess his or her claim.26 Many individuals go through
the asylum process unrepresented by counsel; however,
research confirms that representation greatly increases
an individual’s likelihood of success.27
At the asylum interview, in addition to the I-589
form, an applicant should submit documents to
support his or her claim, including but not limited to
documentation to establish identity, a detailed declaration of the applicant’s past persecution or future fear,
a letter brief drafted by an attorney establishing how
the claim meets the refugee definition, supporting
letters or witness statements from friends, family,
or other individuals, and expert reports. These expert
reports may include a medical examination conducted
by a doctor, a psychological examination conducted by
a psychological professional,28 or what is colloquially
known as an affidavit from a ‘‘country conditions
expert.’’ The country conditions expert is the focus of
this paper.

25

21

Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (BIA 2006).

22

Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582-86 (BIA
2008); Matter of A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (BIA 2007).
23

This concept is undoubtedly confusing, and some
appellate courts have found that the BIA’s own understanding and use of the notion of social visibility has been
so inconsistent that the courts have refused to accord deference to the BIA’s approach of using social visibility. See, e.g.,
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of the United States,
663 F.3d 582, 603-08 (3d Cir. 2011) (refusing to accord
Chevron deference to the concepts of both social visibility
and particularity); Benitez-Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d
426, 430-31 (7th Cir. 2009) (declining to accord Chevron
deference to the BIA’s use of social visibility because the
BIA used the term inconsistently and did not seem to understand the concept); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615-16
(7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the use of social visibility);
see also Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1033 (9th
Cir. 2012) (order granting rehearing en banc for a Salvadoran petitioner who had testified against gangs and feared
persecution on account of her particular social group; in
his concurrence in the original memorandum disposition denying her petition for review, Judge Bea had
suggested that the Ninth Circuit revisit the concept of social
visibility).
24

Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584.

There are eight asylum offices (Arlington, VA;
Chicago, IL; Houston, TX; Los Angeles, CA; Miami, FL;
Newark, NJ; New York City, NY; and San Francisco, CA),
and each of these offices also has asylum officers ‘‘ride
circuit,’’ meaning that they travel to certain other locations
to hear asylum cases. For example, Newark Asylum Office
(ZNK) staffers handle cases in Boston, Massachusetts, and
Buffalo, New York; Chicago Asylum Office staffers (ZCH)
interview in Helena, Montana; Arlington Asylum Office’s
(ZAR) circuit ride to Atlanta, Georgia; and Miami Asylum
Office (ZMI) staffers interview in Jacksonville, Florida, San
Juan, Puerto Rico, and St. Thomas, Virgin Islands.
26

See 8 C.F.R. § 208.9.

27

Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 295, 340 (2007)
(‘‘Represented asylum seekers were granted asylum at a rate
of 45.6%, almost three times as high as the 16.3% grant rate
for those without legal counsel.’’); TRAC Immigration,
Asylum Denial Rate Reaches All Time Low: FY 2010
Results, a Twenty-Five Year Perspective (Sept. 2, 2010),
available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/240
(‘‘During FY 2010, for example, only 11 percent of those
without legal representation [in immigration court] were
granted asylum; with legal representation the odds rose to
54 percent.’’).
28
Note that this paper does not address the role of
psychological and medical experts. The fact that these types
of experts are not analyzed in this paper in no way reflects
their importance in the process. Indeed, these experts can
provide critical information that can make or break any
asylum case, including gender-related claims.
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For the country conditions expert, writing to
support an asylum claim at the asylum office level
requires only a written affidavit and no possibility of
live testimony.29 After an asylum interview, the asylum
officer generally makes one of two decisions30—to
grant asylum or to refer the applicant to immigration
court for de novo review. Thus, by filing an unsuccessful affirmative asylum application, an individual
can receive a Notice to Appear (‘‘NTA’’) in immigration court to face the task of re-presenting her claim
for asylum and the risk of being ordered removed
from the United States if her claim is unsuccessful
there.31
Defensive Asylum
An asylum seeker will be in defensive proceedings,
then, if her affirmative asylum claim is not successful.
An individual may also present asylum claims in immigration court for the first time if he or she is issued an
NTA for immigration court. DHS, through either of its
enforcement agencies, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (‘‘ICE’’) or Customs and Border Protection, may issue an NTA following the expiration of
an individual’s lawful status in the United States or,
at any point, including upon entry into the United

29
Refugee, Asylum and International Operations Directorate, Asylum Division, Affirmative Asylum Procedures
Manual 26 (Nov. 2007, rev. July 2010), available at http://
www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20&%20A
sylum/Asylum/2007_AAPM.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2012)
and www.lexis.com > Immigration > Find Administrative
Materials > Immigration Law & Procedure—Agency
Manuals; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.9.
30

If the applicant is in status, meaning that he or she
has a valid visa at the time of filing for asylum, the officer
may also issue a ‘‘Notice of Intent to Deny,’’ allowing the
applicant a certain amount of time (sixteen days, if the
NOID and response go by mail) to respond to this notice.
Affirmative Asylum Procedures Manual 44. The asylum
office could then issue a final denial of asylum, but would
not refer the individual to immigration court for removal
proceedings, because the individual still has lawful status in
the United States.
31

Review by the immigration court is only the first
‘‘appeal’’ in the process. An unsuccessful asylum applicant
in immigration court may file an appeal with the nation’s
highest immigration tribunal, the Board of Immigration
Appeals. If the BIA agrees with the immigration court’s decision, the asylum applicant may appeal to one of the eleven
federal courts of appeals (according to the state of residence)
and then finally petition for certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court.
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States, where the agencies notice that the individual
is present without status and decide to initiate
proceedings.32
Defensive asylum proceedings are far more
complex than affirmative asylum proceedings. The
immigration courts, as administrative tribunals under
the Executive Office of Immigration Review within
the Department of Justice, generally require the presentation of live testimony from the applicant and any
witnesses, including direct and cross-examination of
those individuals. It is in this context that a country
conditions expert is most likely to provide live or
telephonic testimony in court in addition to supplying
a written affidavit. Asylum proceedings in immigration court are adversarial, meaning that the applicant’s
attorney argues in favor of asylum, while opposing
trial attorneys from ICE’s regional Office of Chief
Counsel may argue against granting relief. An indepth discussion on preparation of experts to testify
in immigration court is included below, under
‘‘Practical Tips.’’
c. Brief Overview of Gender-Based Asylum
Country conditions experts are particularly important in gender-based asylum cases as cultural translators
for the court. To understand gender-based asylum
claims, we must first have an understanding of
‘‘gender.’’ In this context, gender means the societal
roles associated with men and women, while sex

32

The decision whether to initiate proceedings is discretionary, and an individual may come to the attention of the
authorities without proceedings ever being initiated. Although
prosecutorial discretion is nothing new, a 2011 memo issued
by ICE Chief John Morton gave detailed guidance on factors
to consider in exercising prosecutorial discretion. See Memorandum from John Morton, Director of U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, to All Field Office Directors, Special
Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension,
Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011), reprinted
at 16 Bender’s Immigr. Bull. 1236 (App. C) (July 15, 2011),
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/
pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf; see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration
Agencies: A Year in Review, 2012 Emerging Issues 6173;
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Reflections on Prosecutorial
Discretion One Year After the Morton Memo, 2012 Emerging
Issues 6417 (on www.lexis.com). This memo led to the institution of pilot prosecutorial discretion projects in the
Baltimore and Denver immigration courts in an effort to
address the backlog of cases in immigration courts. See
Review of All Removal Cases, 16 Bender’s Immigr. Bull.
1887 (Dec. 15, 2011).
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refers to the biological determinant of ‘‘male’’ versus
‘‘female.’’33 The term ‘‘gender-related asylum’’ generally refers to cases involving either persecution
against a woman because of her gender or failure to
conform to gender norms (gender-related harm),34 or
persecution that takes the form of gender-specific
harm. Gender-specific harm is persecution unique to,
or disproportionately inflicted on, women (including,
for example, FGM, domestic violence, rape, forced
marriage, breast ironing, and widow rituals) regardless
of the reason for infliction. Cases may involve both
gender-specific harm and gender-related harm—i.e., a
woman is subject to a gender-specific harm such as
rape or FGM because of her gender. As mentioned
above, the United States has recognized gender-specific
harms as persecution, including rape, 35 domestic
violence, and FGM.36 One of the main issues in
gender-related cases, then, involves establishing that
the persecution suffered or feared was or will be
imposed because of a nexus to one of the five statutorily protected grounds – race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
Gender-related cases may be tied to religious views.
In Matter of S-A-, the BIA found that a Moroccan
father persecuted his daughter on account of her religious views because she subscribed to a more liberal
version of Islam than her father and differed in her
beliefs on the role of women in society.37 Genderrelated claims may be tied to persecution on account
of political opinion. This may be where a woman’s
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political opinion is, for example, a belief in women’s
rights or equality, feminism, or a woman’s right to
control her own body.38
Often, however, gender-related asylum claims
fall under the particular-social-group ground for
asylum. It is possible and furthermore advised for attorneys to articulate all possible grounds for which a
woman qualifies for asylum where persecution is
inflicted or feared on account of more than one
ground for asylum. As discussed above, current particular-social-group jurisprudence requires that a
particular social group be unified by a common, immutable characteristic. Gender or sex has been recognized
as a common, immutable characteristic that an individual either cannot change or should not be required
to change.39
More recently, as discussed above, the BIA introduced other factors for consideration in social group
formulation, specifically ‘‘social visibility’’ and ‘‘particularity.’’ As a result, defining social group is much more
challenging and the role of country conditions experts
increasingly important. Social visibility requires the
attorney to articulate how the particular social group is
actually perceived by society in the country in question as
a group. Particularity requires the attorney to articulate
how the particular social group is not amorphous, but is
sufficiently well defined that society members could tell
who was within and who was outside the social group.40
Experts on a particular country or culture can be instrumental in helping advocates and adjudicators in

38

33
Heaven Crawley, Refugees and Gender: Law and
Process 7 (2001). It is important to note that even biologically
determined gender categories are fluid and individuals who do
not fit neatly into the ‘‘male’’ or ‘‘female’’ box may also face
persecution and can access asylum protection because they
have suffered or fear harm.
34

Note that gender-related harm encompasses harm
against someone based on his or her sexual orientation or
identity—which can be seen as a failure to conform to
expected gender norms in various cultural contexts.
35

Matter of D-V-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 77, 79-80 (BIA 1993).

36

Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (BIA

1996).
37

2000).

See Saldarriaga v. Gonzalez, 402 F.3d 461, 466
(4th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that ‘‘[l]ess overtly symbolic
acts may also reflect a political opinion’’); Fatin v. INS, 12
F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that there is ‘‘little
doubt that feminism qualifies as a political opinion within the
meaning of the relevant statutes’’); Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813
F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that the applicant
was persecuted on account of her opposition to the ‘‘political
opinion that a man has a right to dominate’’ as demonstrated
by her fleeing her persecutor); see also Abdel-Rahman v.
Gonzales, 493 F.3d 444, 450-51 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding
that an asylum applicant’s political opinion may be imputed
to him by the persecutor at least partially because of ties to
his wife).
39
40

Matter of S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1336 (BIA

Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec 211, 233 (BIA 1985).

As discussed above, supra note 23, two circuit courts
have rejected the notion of social visibility and the Third
Circuit has also rejected particularity.
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understanding how certain groups may or may not be
socially visible and particular.
d. Experts in Asylum Proceedings in General
In 2005, Interpreter Releases published a helpful
overview of the use of experts in defensive asylum
proceedings.41 This paper expands on that article
and provides an update on recent case law regarding
the use of experts. Judicial opinions published since
2005 addressing the use of experts guide the Practical
Tips section below. Notably, the Immigration Court Practice Manual, first published in February 2008, does not
provide any specific guidance on the use of experts in
immigration proceedings, other than to require experts to
be properly listed as witnesses prior to the hearing.42 This
paper considers the use of experts for both affirmative and
defensive asylum proceedings.
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in determining the rules regarding expert testimony in
immigration court. Most instructive are FRE 70244
and 703,45 on testimony of experts and the bases of
an expert’s testimony. Expert opinions or testimony in
immigration court may be based on hearsay evidence.46
The BIA has recognized the probative value of expert
testimony in immigration court because ‘‘Immigration
Judges, like other trial judges generally, are often required
to determine factual disputes regarding matters on which
they possess little or no knowledge or substantive expertise,
and, in making such determinations, they typically rely
on evidence, including expert testimony, presented by
the parties.’’47
Individuals who are experts on a particular culture,
region, or country are often referred to as ‘‘country
conditions experts.’’ No guidelines or rules govern

Immigration courts are not governed by the Federal
Rules of Evidence (‘‘FRE’’). Indeed, the evidentiary
requirements that govern federal courts are relaxed in immigration court.43 Nonetheless, the FRE can serve as guidance
44

FRE 702 states:
Testimony by Expert Witnesses[:] A witness
who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in
the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue;
(b) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts
or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

41

See Rachael Keast, Using Experts for Asylum Cases in
Immigration Court, 82 Interpreter Releases 1237 (Aug. 1,
2005). Also instructive is BIA Member and former IJ Garry
Malphrus’s piece Expert Witnesses in Immigration Proceedings, published in the May 2010 issue of the Executive Office
of Immigration Review’s Immigration Law Advisor (Vol. 4,
No. 5), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ILANewsleter/ILA%202010/vol4no5.pdf.
42
See Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, Immigration Court Practice Manual § 3.3(g) (2008), available at http://
www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/ocij_page1.htm
and www.lexis.com > Immigration > Find Administrative Materials > Immigration Law & Procedure — Agency
Manuals (requiring experts to be listed as witnesses
and a curriculum vitae or résumé to be attached to the
witness list).
43
See Matter of Devera, 16 I. & N. Dec. 266, 268-69
(BIA 1977); see also Matter of V-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 500, 502
n.2 (BIA 2008) (stating that expert evidence can be accepted
to help to satisfy a party’s burdens of proof and persuasion).

45

FRE 703 states:
Bases of an Expert’s Opinion Testimony[:]
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data
in the case that the expert has been made aware of
or personally observed. If experts in the particular
field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts
or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they
need not be admissible for the opinion to be
admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise
be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may
disclose them to the jury only if their probative
value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.

46
Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 706 n.7 (9th
Cir. 2010) (‘‘An expert is permitted to base his opinion on
hearsay evidence and need not have personal knowledge of
the facts underlying his opinion.’’).
47
Matter of Marcal Neto, 25 I. & N. Dec. 169, 176 (BIA
2010) (emphasis added).
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how much time, if any, an expert must have spent
within a culture or country or whether that time spent
must be recent.48 Similarly, an expert need not have
published academic articles or books on the subject
matter of his or her testimony. Further, no requirement
exists as to the expert’s level of education, although
many experts commonly retained for asylum proceedings hold doctoral degrees.
II.

CULTURAL TRANSLATORS FOR THE
COURT: THE ROLE OF EXPERTS IN
GENDER-BASED ASYLUM CASES

This section will highlight some of the key issues in
gender-based asylum cases that collaboration with a
country conditions expert can help to address.
a.

Explaining Cultural Issues that May Affect
Credibility

An expert who is well versed in a specific culture
may be able to assist a decisionmaker in assessing credibility. Credibility is a key issue in the adjudication of
asylum claims.49 Indeed, because the circumstances of
sudden or unanticipated flight from a country may mean
that an individual has little documentary evidence to
support her claim, cases often hinge on the testimony
of the individual him- or herself.50 That testimony must,
above all, be credible. Of course, credibility is in the
eye of the adjudicator, and the adjudicator comes to
each case not as a blank slate, but as a human being
with his or her own cultural experiences, biases, expectations, and perspective. The decision that an IJ

48

See Koval v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 798, 808-09 (7th Cir.
2005) (finding that IJ erred in excluding expert testimony
where expert had not been to the country in question in
twelve years).
49

Under section 101(a)(3) of the REAL ID Act of 2005,
Div. B of Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, 303 (codified at
INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)), a trier
of fact may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base
a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s demeanor, the
plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in statements,
without regard to whether they go to the heart of the asylum
claim.
50
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (‘‘testimony of the applicant, if
credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof
without corroboration’’). But see Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. &
N. Dec. 722 (BIA 1997) (corroborating evidence should be
submitted where reasonably available, or an explanation
should be made as to why it was not submitted); Matter of
J-Y-C-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 260 (BIA 2007) (under the REAL ID
Act an IJ may, considering the totality of the circumstances,
base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s demeanor,
the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in statements, without regard to whether they go to the heart of the
asylum claim).
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makes regarding credibility is accorded a high level of
deference on appeal,51 and thus attorneys should focus
on ensuring that any potential credibility concerns for
their client’s case are adequately addressed.
The U.S. Gender Guidelines, issued in 1995,
explain that an adjudicator should understand when
assessing demeanor and credibility that an individual
who has suffered trauma may appear ‘‘numb or show
emotional passivity [or] may give matter-of-fact recitations of serious instances of mistreatment.’’52 Further,
trauma may cause damaged or distorted memories and
may block an individual from recounting certain
events.53 The Guidelines also specify that a lack of
eye contact or averting one’s gaze may be culturally
influenced.54
A country conditions expert can assist an asylum
officer or IJ in the very difficult task of suspending
his or her own biases and assumptions, and placing
the facts and the individual asylum seeker before him
or her in the culture of the context from which they
came.
Giselle,55 a Cameroonian Bamileke woman, sought
asylum in the United States on account of the persecution she had suffered based on her sexual orientation.
During her asylum interview, Giselle responded to the
asylum officer’s questions about her marriage by
explaining that it was a happy marriage. This contradicted the very basis of Giselle’s claim, which included
past persecution at the hands of her husband on account

51
See Matter of A-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1106 (BIA 1998);
see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (‘‘Facts determined by the
immigration judge, including findings as to the credibility of
testimony’’ are subject to a ‘‘clearly erroneous’’ standard).
52

Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Director of Office
of International Affairs, Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., to all
INS Asylum Officers, Considerations for Asylum Officers
Adjudicating Claims from Women 6-7 (May 26, 1995),
reprinted at 7 Int’l J. Refugee L. 200 (1995), available at
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/documents/legal/guidelines_us.pdf
(last visited Feb. 20, 2012). Demeanor means ‘‘how a person
handles himself/herself physically; for example, maintaining
eye contact, shifts in posture, and hesitations in speech.’’
53

Id.

54

Id.; see also Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen., 411 F.3d 135 (3d
Cir. 2005) (reversing and remanding IJ and BIA’s adverse
credibility finding in part based on failure to take into
account gender guidelines on credibility, trauma, the sensitive
nature of gender-based harm, and eye contact).
55
All individual case examples provided in this paper are
from former or current clients of the Tahirih Justice Center
who each provided consent to the anonymous use of the facts
of their cases.
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of her sexual orientation. Giselle’s case was referred
to immigration court based on credibility concerns.
At first, Giselle could not even acknowledge that
she had not told the truth, but after working with a
psychologist for some time, Giselle explained that in
the Bamileke culture, marriage is sacred and that a
woman would lose respect and honor if she did not
have a happy marriage. As such, Giselle had always
covered up her husband’s abuse and portrayed to her
family, friends, and colleagues that he was a great man
and they were very happy together. Thanks to this revelation, Giselle’s attorneys submitted a supplemental
affidavit from their country conditions expert to the
immigration court. The expert affidavit affirmed that
Giselle’s explanation was consistent with Bamileke
views on marriage and family life and that Giselle’s
reluctance to disclose her unhappy marriage to a
stranger was understandable in the cultural context
from which she came. With this supplemental information, the IJ was willing to grant asylum, overcoming the
initial hurdle that Giselle’s cultural background posed
to her apparent credibility.
Walter Kälin’s seminal article on the role that
cultural differences can play in credibility determinations in asylum proceedings examines five main issue
areas: (1) the manner in which the asylum seeker
expresses him- or herself, (2) issues posed by interpretation, (3) cultural relativity of various notions and
concepts, (4) differing perceptions of time, and (5)
cultural relativity of the concepts of ‘‘lie’’ and
‘‘truth.’’56 Kälin proposes that one way to overcome
these hurdles would be for adjudicators to focus on
asylum claims from ‘‘only one or a few culturally
similar countries.’’57 This is not the system we have
in the United States, and country conditions experts
can thus play a pivotal role in educating decisionmakers
as to the many cultural contexts that they must confront
on a daily basis.
b.

Explaining Conditions on the Ground in
Country of Origin; Corroborating the
Asylum Claim

Corroborating evidence to support an asylum claim
has taken on increasing importance in recent years. The
REAL ID Act of 2005 amended the INA, which
includes all provisions on asylum, to state that an applicant’s testimony may be sufficient to sustain his burden

56
Walter Kälin, Troubled Communication: CrossCultural Misunderstandings in the Asylum-Hearing, 20 Int’l
Migration Rev. 230 (1986).
57

Id.
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of proof without corroboration if it is demonstrably
credible, persuasive, and probative of facts sufficient
to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.58
However, if the trier of fact determines that corroborative evidence should be produced, it ‘‘must be provided
unless the applicant does not have the evidence and
cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.’’59 Input from
a country conditions expert can be invaluable in cases
where the applicant simply cannot provide corroborating evidence for her claim due to the circumstances
of her flight or other factors.
Expert affidavits provided strong corroborating
evidence to support the applicant’s declaration in testimony in Zeyna’s case. Zeyna is a Fulani Muslim
woman from Guinea, who was forcibly subjected to
FGM at the age of six and forced into marriage at the
age of twelve. Zeyna feared return to Guinea because
she had suffered threats and beatings for refusing to
allow her husband’s family to perform FGM on her
daughter. The three country conditions experts retained
for the case commented specifically on FGM and child
marriage as practiced by the Fulani in Guinea. The
expert’s detailed affidavit corroborated Zeyna’s own
detailed account of these events. Although Zeyna
herself had no evidence or other witnesses regarding
the persecution she had suffered, the country conditions
expert was able to confirm that the applicant’s account
conformed with her understanding of cultural practices
in that country and specific ethnic group.
Country conditions experts can also fill in gaps in
asylum claims where there is a lack of information on
the treatment of a particular group or phenomenon in
the generally available reports on the human rights
situation in the country of origin. For example, a
Cameroonian lesbian had been subjected, among
other harm, to imprisonment, rape, and beatings at the
hands of the police. Very little literature exists on the
treatment of women in prison, and the expert retained
for the case was able to explain the underreporting on
this issue. Due to the extreme shame and stigma that
survivors of gender-based violence often face, statistics
or reports on gender-based violence within a country,
for example, rape of male and female prisoners in
Cameroon, may be underreported. Another recent
case involved a Beninese woman who was promised

58
REAL ID Act of 2005, Div. B of Pub. L. No. 109-13,
§ 101(a)(3), 119 Stat. 302, 303 (INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)).
59

Id.
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in marriage to a vaudou/vodun follower and was
forcibly subjected to widow rituals and inherited by
his brother when the follower passed away. Few credible sources detail widow rituals and the vaudou/vodun
religion in Benin. Where there are no other documents
from human rights organizations, international bodies,
or the U.S. State Department discussing a particular
harm or treatment of a group, retaining an expert specifically to analyze the claim and provide any additional
insight is invaluable.
For attorneys, experts can also sometimes play a
key role in the early stages of a case by assisting the
attorney in assessing and advising an individual on the
merits of his or her potential asylum claim. Attorneys
occasionally seek input from an expert on a particular
country or culture when faced with a borderline case or
one where the resolution of a legal issue may hinge on
country conditions information. For example, a native
and citizen of Mali had fled to Côte D’Ivoire and lived
there safely for a number of years. Firm resettlement in
another country is a bar to asylum eligibility in the
United States.60 Therefore, the attorneys needed to
understand whether this client was firmly resettled in
Côte D’Ivoire. A preliminary consultation with an
expert enabled the attorneys to verify the fluidity of
movement across borders and the deep cultural ties of
members of the tribe in question between the two countries. The attorneys quickly ascertained that they would
be able to argue that the woman was not firmly resettled
in Côte D’Ivoire because her persecutors could easily
move across borders between Mali and Côte D’Ivoire.
The attorneys could advise the individual on the
merits of her potential asylum case and move forward
with representation. Attorneys often undertake initial
country conditions research to corroborate an individual’s story prior to taking a case, but where that
information is not easily available or is highly specialized, input from an expert at this early stage can be
invaluable.
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c.

Role of Experts in Addressing Concerns
Regarding Social Visibility and Particularity
in Particular Social Group Formulation

As discussed briefly above, asylum law on particular
social group, one of the five protected grounds on which
persecution may be inflicted, is extraordinarily complex.
Historically, the BIA found that a particular social group,
as with the other grounds for asylum, had to be united by
some ‘‘common immutable characteristic’’—meaning
that the shared characteristic was something that the individual either could not change (much like race) or should
not be required to change (like religion or political
opinion).
Again, in 2006 the BIA introduced two new
concepts: ‘‘social visibility’’ and ‘‘particularity.’’61
Social visibility, although a confusing term, is properly
understood as the requirement that society in the
country in question perceive that particular social
group as a group.62 Particularity requires that ‘‘the
proposed group can accurately be described in a
manner sufficiently distinct that the groups would be
recognized, in the society in question, as a discrete
class of persons.’’63
Social visibility requires that the adjudicator,
whether an asylum officer or an immigration judge,
weigh how a certain group is perceived in the relevant
country. Particularity requires the adjudicator to
examine whether it is possible to determine whether
or not an individual is a member of the group. Thus,
both of these new factors require a deep understanding
of the cultural context in which the group exists. Advocates and commentators have expressed concern about
how the social visibility and particularity factors may
adversely affect the asylum claims of women and

61

60

See 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (Firm resettlement is an ‘‘offer
of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of
permanent resettlement’’ in another country prior to the applicant reaching the United States. An applicant is not firmly
resettled where he or she establishes that ‘‘his or her entry
into that country was a necessary consequence of his or her
flight from persecution, that he or she remained in that country
only as long as was necessary to arrange onward travel, and
that he or she did not establish significant ties in that country’’
or where ‘‘the conditions of his or her residence in that country
were so substantially and consciously restricted by the
authority of the country of refuge that he or she was not in
fact resettled.’’).

I should note that the Matter of C-A- case was not
actually the first time that the concept of social visibility
was introduced. The BIA also alluded to consideration of
such a factor in the 1999 decision in the Matter of R-Acase. See Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 918 (BIA
1999) (finding it troubling that the IJ did not consider
‘‘whether anyone in Guatemala perceives this group to exist
in any form whatsoever’’; ‘‘we believe there must also be
some showing of how the characteristic is understood in the
alien’s society . . .’’), remanded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (Att’y
Gen. 2005), stay lifted, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (Att’y Gen. 2008).
62

See supra note 23 (discussing Seventh and Third
Circuits’ rejection of social visibility and particularity and
Ninth Circuit’s reassessing of the concepts).
63

2008).

Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (BIA
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those fleeing persecution based on sexual orientation.64
This is where country conditions experts can play an
especially pivotal role in an asylum case.
Country conditions experts can assist an attorney in
addressing social visibility and particularity because
they often have insight on cultural attitudes towards
different groups, which can help to establish that the
group is in fact perceived as a group in the country in
question or that group membership could be readily
determined. A country conditions expert can explain
how ‘‘divorced Nigerian women,’’ ‘‘Cameroonian
widows,’’ ‘‘Liberian married women unable to leave
the relationship,’’ or ‘‘Tanzanian women in a domestic
relationship and viewed as property by virtue of their
status in a relationship’’ are groups that are indeed
readily identifiable in a society.
A 2011 case involved Sarah, a young Congolese
woman. When Sarah was just fifteen, Congolese
government agents arrested, detained, raped, and threatened her because they were looking for her brother-inlaw and her half-sister, who were, unlike Sarah, both of
Tutsi ethnic origin. Sarah’s attorney argued that she
was persecuted on account of her membership in
a particular social group of ‘‘family members of
Tutsis or suspected Tutsis.’’ The country conditions
expert in the case was able to explain in her affidavit
and through her in-court testimony that in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ‘‘family members of
Tutsis’’ would in fact be a socially visible group—
perceived by society as a group—because of the interconnectedness of Congolese society and the strong
animus towards Tutsis, who were often perceived as
foreigners or outsiders. Further, the country conditions
expert explained that targeting family members of
Tutsis was actually a common strategy used by armed
militias. This information helped to establish that the
group was socially visible and that the persecution
suffered was tied to a protected ground, which brings
us to nexus, discussed below.
d.

Establishing Nexus of the Harm to a
Protected Ground

Experts play a similarly important role in establishing nexus to one of the five statutorily protected

64

See Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of
‘‘Social Visibility’’ in Defining a ‘‘Particular Social Group’’
and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual
Orientation and Gender, 27 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 47 (2008);
see also Lindsay M. Harris & Morgan Weibel, Matter of S-EG-: A Final Nail in the Coffin of Gang-Related Asylum
Claims? 20 Berkeley La Raza L. J. 5 (2010).
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grounds. Again, nexus means that the persecution
suffered or feared was or is because of one of the five
grounds. An applicant may provide either direct
or circumstantial evidence of the persecutor’s motive
to show the connection to one of the five grounds.
Direct evidence, perhaps statements made by the persecutor, is obviously most likely to come from the
applicant herself. Experts, however, may be able to
explain the cultural context for the persecution so that
any link between the harm perpetrated or feared and
the protected ground can be made. This could constitute
circumstantial evidence of the persecutor’s motive
for the persecution.
For example, in Sarah’s case discussed in section c,
Sarah herself recounted that her persecutors, armed
soldiers in the Eastern region of Congo, referred to
her sister and brother-in-law and their being Tutsi
when they raped her. This is direct evidence that the
motive for their persecution was because of her
membership in a particular social group of family
members of Tutsis. The country conditions expert was
able to provide circumstantial evidence regarding the
motives of the soldiers. She explained that the Congolese national armed forces were made up of former rebel
groups, and in the region in question they were made
up of soldiers from a particular rebel faction who
had historically fought against Tutsis and harbored
racial animus towards Tutsis and to anyone associated
with Tutsis, including by family ties. Thus, the country
condition’s expert affidavit was useful in establishing
nexus of the harm suffered to one of the protected
grounds—Sarah’s membership in a particular social
group of ‘‘family members of Tutsis or suspected
Tutsis.’’
In the Guinean case discussed above, involving
Zeyna, a Fulani Muslim woman, and her daughter
who faced forced FGM, the country conditions
experts spoke to the cultural motivations for FGM
and child marriage as well as the role of extended
family in a Fulani girl’s life and how any opposition
to the extended family’s plan for a girl would be
perceived. Thus, the experts provided the cultural
context to address the issue of nexus of the persecution
to a protected ground. Using the expert affidavits, the
attorney was able to establish that the applicant had
faced harm and would face further persecution
because of her membership in the particular social
group of ‘‘family members of uncut Fulani Muslim
girls who oppose FGM.’’ Social, economic, political,
racial, or other dynamics at play are often critical in
establishing nexus to a protected ground, and country
conditions experts provide that cultural context.
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e. Persecution by Non-state Actors, Government
Willingness or Ability to Protect, and Internal
Relocation
In any asylum case, the applicant must prove that
his or her government is unable or unwilling to protect
the applicant from harm. In cases involving government persecution, this is a straightforward argument.
In gender-based asylum cases, however, which often
involve harm from a ‘‘non-state actor,’’ this argument
becomes more complex. Where a woman fears persecution from a family member or some other non-state
entity, she must prove that the government is either
unwilling or unable to protect her from persecution.
A government’s unwillingness to protect may be
shown through reference to a country’s legal code.
For example, in Cameroon there is no law to protect
women from spousal abuse, and marital rape is indeed
an exception under the law to the crime of rape.65 Thus,
in that instance it may be quite straightforward to
argue that the government is unwilling to protect a
woman who fears harm from her spouse. Nonetheless,
a country conditions expert who is able to speak to the
culture of impunity for domestic abuse within
Cameroon or to the unlikelihood that the police would
take reports of domestic abuse seriously would
strengthen the case.
A more challenging situation may arise where the
government in question has made efforts to protect individuals like the applicant in question. For example, in a
2012 case involving a Ghanaian woman fleeing
domestic violence, the attorney engaged a country
conditions expert because Ghana had passed a fairly
progressive domestic violence law in 2007. Thus, the
applicant had to show that despite the legislation, the
Ghanaian government remained either unwilling or
unable to protect the applicant from harm. This required
an expert with a deep understanding of not only the
law itself, but also its implementation and the cultural
context in which the law was being implemented. In
situations like this, country conditions experts who
understand the intersection of law and culture in a
country may provide key evidence to explain persecution by non-state actors and government inability or
unwillingness to protect.

1821

November 15, 2012
Country conditions experts are always important
in helping to establish that an individual does not
have an internal flight alternative—meaning that she
could reasonably relocate within her own country
without facing harm. Where the persecutor is the
government, persecution throughout a country is
presumed, but in gender cases where the persecutor is
often a non-state actor country conditions experts play a
critical role in explaining how various societal and
cultural factors would make internal relocation either
impossible or unreasonable. For example, a country
conditions expert can speak to the interconnectedness
of the culture in a particular country and the networks
or ties a particular persecutor may have within that
country. Further, an expert can often address how a
woman would be received culturally and socially in
other locations in the country and whether she would
be able to support herself economically.
III.

PRACTICAL TIPS FOR ATTORNEYS
AND EXPERTS

This section provides some concrete guidance and
tips for both advocates and experts working together to
present gender-based and other asylum cases. It is the
aim of the author that these practice pointers start a
discussion between and among attorneys and experts
to establish a better understanding of best practices
in presenting these cases and in the relationship
between attorney and expert.
a.

Practice Pointers for Attorneys Working
with Experts

First, consider whether your case needs an expert.
As Rachael Keast asserts in her 2005 article,
Where reliable documentary evidence is available that corroborates your client’s claim, expert
testimony may be unnecessary. Cases in which
expert testimony may prove especially useful
include those where: (1) there is a lack of documentary evidence focusing on the particular
issue or geographical area; (2) conditions in
the client’s country are rapidly changing so
current and reliable information is not available;
and (3) the facts are very specific to the client,
such as in cases involving psychological or
physical conditions, or cultural norms as they
impact the client’s demeanor or ability to
testify.66

65

U.S. Department of State 2011 Human Rights Report:
Cameroon, available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/
humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=186173
(‘‘The law does not address spousal rape.’’). DOS Human
Rights Reports also are on the www.lexis.com service
(Immigration > Find Administrative Materials > Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices).

66

See Keast, supra note 41, at 1237.
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In some cases, then, there may be little utility in using a
country conditions expert.67 Further, even in a case
where you have worked with an expert, if the expert’s
final affidavit does not support your case or undermines
it in any way, do not be afraid to abandon the use of that
affidavit. Presenting the best possible case for your
client is of course always the priority.
Second, once you have determined that an expert
would help your case, build time into your case plan to
research, locate, and secure expert assistance. Many
experts have highly particularized knowledge, and
thus one individual may be the expert on the specific
issue in question in the relevant country or culture.
Thus, those experts may be inundated with requests
and may be able to accommodate only so many requests,
or so many pro bono requests, within a specific time
frame. Some good places to start in locating experts
include:

Academic associations, for example the American Political Science Association and the
African Studies Association, which maintain
databases of country conditions experts.


FRLAN – Fahamu Refugee Legal Aid Program,
a network that works to provide individuals and
attorneys in the Global South with information
and resources to assist in asylum and refugee
determination processes.68



Associations of returned Peace Corps volunteers, known usually as ‘‘Friends of [a certain
country].’’69



Equality Now, a global organization dedicated
to ending violence against women and girls.70
The Center for Gender and Refugee Studies,
which maintains information for country conditions experts related to gender-based claims,
which it can share in response to requests for
technical assistance from attorneys handling gender-based or other social-group-based
cases.71



67

See Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 646-47 (7th
Cir. 2005) (court found that the IJ’s denial of a motion for
telephonic testimony for a London-based expert was not
prejudicial, because the expert would not have said anything
to change the outcome of the case).
68

See http://frlan.org/, with experts listed by country.

69

For example, see Friends of Guinea: http://
www.friendsofguinea.org/pcguinea/pcguinea.shtml.
70
71

See www.equalitynow.org.

For cases involving gender-based claims, contact
cgrs.uchastings.edu for technical assistance and suggestions
on country conditions experts.
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Other attorneys handling cases, any listservs, or
networks for asylum or immigration attorneys.72



If all else fails, conduct Internet searches on your issue
and country, figure out anyone who has published
articles or other pieces on the issue, and follow up
with those individuals.
Third, manage expectations up front with your
expert. The most successful expert affidavits generally
result from strong communication between advocate
and expert. Consider using a contract to outline the
expert’s role and also clarify confidentiality issues.73
Once roles are clarified, ensure that you have sent
your expert all the relevant information that he or
she needs to craft the affidavit, including a draft of
your client’s declaration in support of her asylum
claim. Let the expert know that it will be important
for you to review the draft affidavit and make suggestions to ensure that it not only supports the case, but
also cannot undermine the case in any way. Finally,
manage expert expectations when it comes to preparation to testify and explain that trial preparation will be
important for both you as an attorney and the individual as an expert witness. It is important to note that
given the backlogs in many immigration courts there
could be unforeseeable delays or continuances in the
case. Prepare your expert for a long wait.
Fourth, build in time to review drafts of your
expert’s proposed affidavit for content and for typos.
The strongest expert affidavits generally develop over
time as the attorney and expert home in on the key
issues in the case. You will need to make sure that the
expert affidavit is consistent with the other evidence you
submit in support of your client’s case or evidence
already in the record.74 Further, any decisionmaker

72
In the Washington, DC, metropolitan area such a listserv is operated by the Central Area Immigrant’s Rights
Coalition. See http://www.caircoalition.org/.
73
Increasingly academic experts are interested in writing
about their service as expert witnesses in asylum proceedings
and the cases in which they are involved. This is welcome, but
does not come without ethical concerns for the protection of
client information and attorney-client work product and
communications. Consult your own organizational policies
or local ethical rules to ascertain the bounds of confidentiality
in working with an expert. Experts usually sign confidentiality
agreements when retained for an asylum case.
74

See Matter of E-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 77, 81 (BIA 1989)
(‘‘[I]n determining the weight of an affidavit, it should be
examined first to determine upon what basis the affiant is
making the statement and whether the statement is internally
consistent, plausible, or even credible. Most important is
whether the statement of the affiant is consistent with other
evidence in the record.’’).
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is likely to find your expert more credible and reliable if mistakes, including typographical errors,
spelling mistakes, and minor factual discrepancies, are
eliminated.

motion for telephonic testimony.77 Just as you would
with a client, consider whether you will need to request
an interpreter for your expert and practice your direct
examination using an interpreter.

Fifth, request a curriculum vitae or résumé
reflecting the expert’s education, experience, research,
and publications. Sometimes where experts have long
résumés it may make sense to trim irrelevant publications or experience. Make sure that your expert
is qualified to speak specifically to the issues involved
in your case.75

Seventh, if your asylum case is denied and the IJ
does not pay appropriate attention to your expert’s affidavit or testimony, consider appealing the decision on
that ground in addition to any other grounds for appeal.
Several courts of appeals have found that an IJ’s decision to exclude expert testimony was a violation of the
applicant’s due process rights.78

Sixth, prepare adequately for immigration court by
following all required procedures. Adequate preparation means drafting your direct examination questions
for your expert ahead of time and communicating those
questions to the expert, preferably in the form of a live
preparation session. Observe all the general best practices when it comes to direct examination–just because
you are not working with a client, do not assume that
the answers you are looking for are intuitive to the
expert. Craft the questions precisely to elicit the
responses that you need to best support your client’s
case.

Further, circuit courts have also reversed and
remanded where an IJ has not paid sufficient attention
to expert testimony. For example, in Tassi v. Holder,
the IJ discredited the testimony of a Cameroonian
judge offered as an expert because the expert had no
firsthand knowledge of the applicant’s persecution in
Cameroon.79 On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit
cited FRE 703 and found that an expert is entitled to
rely on factual underpinnings, including those based on
hearsay, that are ‘‘of a type reasonably relied upon by

If possible, prior to your immigration court hearing
seek a stipulation to your expert’s qualifications from
the government trial counsel. If you are unable to reach
an agreement, ensure that you are well prepared to
present your expert’s credentials through voir dire on
the day of the hearing.

77
The Seventh Circuit has held that telephonic testimony
is more acceptable for experts because observable factors, like
demeanor, are less important in assessing expert testimony.
See Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2005).
Make sure that you follow all required court procedures in
requesting telephonic or live testimony. See Djedovic v.
Gonzales, 441 F.3d 547, 550-52 (7th Cir. 2006) (court
found IJ’s denial of telephonic testimony from a professor
of Balkan history nonprejudicial where the applicant’s
attorney filed the motion for telephonic testimony only two
days prior to the hearing and then did not submit a written
affidavit as the IJ requested); see also Singh v. Ashcroft, 398
F.3d 396, 407 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that there was no error
in the IJ excluding expert testimony where the attorney did not
seek permission for expert testimony before the hearing).

Prior to your hearing, observe all the rules outlined
in the immigration court practice manual, including
submitting your witness list in accordance with
§ 3.3(g) and specifying the length of time needed for
each witness’ testimony. When submitting your
expert’s affidavit, submit one with an original signature
if possible76 and include your expert’s CV or résumé. If
your expert is unable to appear in person, timely file a

75
Diop v. Holder, 586 F.3d 587, 592 (8th Cir. 2009)
(finding no prejudice where the IJ excluded testimony in a
Senegalese asylum claim involving FGM where the expert
had not been to Senegal or done any research specific to the
Toucoleur tribe).
76

If an original signature is not available, argue that a
copy will suffice (under FRE 1003, a duplicate is admissible if
identical).

78
See, e.g., Zolotukhin v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1073,
1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the IJ’s denial of telephonic
testimony of an expert in Moscow was prejudicial
and violated the petitioner’s due process rights where the IJ
had also refused other testimony from the petitioner and his
family members). In Ntangsi v. Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit
declined to reach the issue of whether the applicant’s due
process rights were violated when telephonic testimony of
her witnesses was denied, but the opinion suggests that
failure to admit this evidence may have been a violation.
475 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Tadesse v. Gonzales,
492 F.3d 905, 909 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the IJ’s refusal
to consider a country conditions expert’s affidavit or testimony was a violation of the applicant’s ‘‘right to present
evidence on her own behalf, for an IJ may not bar whole
chunks of material evidence favorable to the petitioner.’’);
Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2003)
(finding the exclusion of an expert’s telephonic testimony
prejudicial).
79

660 F.3d 710, 721 (4th Cir. 2011).
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experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences on the subject.’’80 The court found that the
IJ had erroneously rejected probative aspects of the
expert’s testimony without providing a specific cogent
reason for disregarding this evidence.81 The IJ had also
erred in discrediting other evidence and finding the
petitioners not credible, so the court vacated and
remanded.82
Similarly, in Tun v. Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit
found a due process violation where the IJ gave no
weight to an affidavit from a clearly qualified expert on
country conditions in Burma because the expert was not
available for cross-examination by the government.83
In that case there were other due process violations,
including poor translation and denial of a medical
expert’s testimony, and the court reversed and remanded
the case.84
Failure to take into account expert testimony
alone may not be a sufficient ground for a successful
appeal, but it can play a role in the decision of an appellate court to reverse the decision below. Courts have
been especially inclined to remand cases where the IJ
failed to give any explanation why specific testimony
from an expert was excluded, or admitted but not
considered.85

80

Id.

81

Id. at 721-22.

82
Id. at 726; see also Abulashvili v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d
197, 209 n.12 (3d Cir. 2011) (remanding based on a host of
issues and urging that the BIA consider a country conditions
expert’s opinion on remand); Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762,
773 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the BIA failed to give
reasoned consideration to potentially dispositive testimony
by an applicant’s two expert witnesses because the BIA
‘‘mischaracterized the record with regard to one of the expert’s
consistency with the State Department reports, criticized that
expert’s testimony on a basis belied by the record, and failed
even to acknowledge’’ the other expert witness); Koval v.
Gonzalez, 418 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing and
remanding where the IJ had excluded expert testimony and
misapplied the standard for economic persecution).
83

485 F.3d 1014, 1028-29 (8th Cir. 2007).

84

Id. at 1026-28, 1029-31.
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Finally, remember to let the expert know the result
of your case if it is not immediately apparent from his or
her involvement in proceedings.
b. Practice Pointers for Country Conditions
Expert Witnesses
When you are considering getting involved in an
asylum case:


Clarify whether you are taking the case pro bono
or for a fee.86



Seek clarity on the forum: Is this case before the
asylum office or the immigration court? Which
immigration court? Does the attorney anticipate
presenting your testimony live?
Ensure that you have the expertise required on
the case and can speak to the issues raised. For
example, an expert on FGM in one particular
tribe within a country may or may not be the
best choice for a case involving an individual
from a different tribe within that country or
from a different country.87



Clarify issues involving confidentiality. If you
are an academic who would like to use a specific
individual’s story or your experience working
on an asylum case in your own published writings, check with the attorney on the case to see
whether this seems possible. Consider the
ethical rules applying to your discipline and
the use of ‘‘subjects’’ or individuals and their
case histories.



A standard expert affidavit should be structured as
follows:
(1) Outline of the expert’s own credentials,
including education, relevant research, expertise, publications, and awards;
(2) Statement regarding whether the expert is
receiving payment for the affidavit and
whether the expert is personally acquainted
with the applicant or has met the applicant;
(3) Background on the relevant country conditions
at issue;
(4) Discussion of the applicant’s case, which
should include at a minimum: the plausibility
of the applicant’s version of events and how it

85

See, e.g., Morgan v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 1201, 1211
(9th Cir. 2008) (remanding where, among other errors, the
BIA failed to adequately consider psychological expert
reports); Leia v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427, 434-45 (3d
Cir. 2005) (remanding where the parties had agreed that
a witness was a country conditions expert and the BIA
approved an IJ’s rejection of the expert’s testimony without
any explanation).

86
In Matter of M-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 484 (BIA 1953), the
BIA explained that the fact that an expert had appeared in
many cases and was paid a fee was a valid consideration in
evaluating the evidence, but was not dispositive in determining bias.
87

See Diop v. Holder, 586 F.3d 587 (8th Cir. 2009).
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comports with your understanding of the
country in question, the likelihood of harm
upon return to the country of origin, and the
possibility of the applicant being able to reasonably relocate within the country of origin;

1825

November 15, 2012
Important points to keep in mind if you are asked
to testify in immigration court:


Pitfalls to avoid when structuring and writing
your report:

Consider making yourself available to testify
under oath in court,91 either in person or by
telephone. Although IJs will likely accept your
affidavit as admissible without your testimony,
your statement may be given less weight if you
are not produced for cross-examination.92



A restatement of the applicant’s story or declaration is not useful and will tend to irritate an IJ
or asylum officer.

If it is not offered, ask for a preparation session
with the attorney on the case.



Prior to the hearing, you should be familiar
with all of the questions the attorney will ask
you and have been prepped on potential crossexamination questions.
Be ready to answer questions about your qualifications — how much time you have spent
physically within the country in question, how
long and in what depth and capacity you have
studied the country or culture at issue, your
educational background, and your previous
experience, if any, as an expert in asylum cases.

(5) Expert conclusions and an explanation of the
basis for those conclusions.



Ensure that the tone of the report is not that of
an advocate or someone acting as an adjudicator,
but is that of an expert. While an expert may
comment that, for example, based on his or her
expertise the applicant’s claim is highly credible,
the expert should not advocate one way or
another for a decision in the applicant’s case.88



Make sure that your affidavit is not conclusory
in nature. The affidavit must contain sufficient
facts and rationale to support the conclusions
that you draw.
Avoid submitting a standardized affidavit.
Instead, tailor each report to the specific individual you are assisting. While it is understandable
to copy and paste paragraphs from previous
similar cases, make sure that as you edit the affidavit in its final stages all the information
included applies to the case at hand.89 Your affidavit will be given less weight if it is not
particularized to the specific case involved.90





88
In general witnesses may not opine on questions of
law. See Matter of Cruzado, 14 I. & N. Dec. 513, 515 (BIA
1983) (holding that the opinion of a professor and others as to
the proper construction of a state statute is not admissible).
Therefore, the IJ or asylum officer will not give weight to any
expert opinion on whether or not asylum should be granted.
One exception to this rule is where an expert may actually be
an expert on foreign law and/or procedures and may opine
on those questions of law. See Matter of Rowe, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 962 (BIA 2006).
89

Courts have properly excluded expert affidavits where
the affidavits do not address the relevant issues in the case at
hand. See, e.g., Kucana v. Holder, 603 F.3d 394 (7th Cir. 2010).
90
See Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir. 2006)
(finding that an affidavit from a retired U.S. census employee
and immigration expert, the ‘‘Aird Affidavit’’ on coercive
population control policies in China, had been used in more
than 200 asylum cases and that the relevance and weight of an
affidavit could be limited if it was ‘‘not prepared specifically
for the petitioner and is not particularized to his circumstances.’’).





Review your expert affidavit the day before you
testify so that what you wrote is fresh in your
mind.



Let go of your preconceived notions of court
practice. Immigration court is not bound by
the rules of federal evidence, and therefore
hearsay is admissible.

IV. CONCLUSION
This article is not intended to provide an exhaustive
review of the wide range of issues that arise when
working with experts on asylum cases and genderbased asylum cases in particular, or when serving as
an expert. Rather, it is intended to provide guidance
to attorneys on the benefits and appropriate use of
experts on these complex cases and to experts who
evaluate and assess such cases. It is hoped that this
article will foster further dialogue among attorneys,
experts, and clients to better understand the nuances
and needs of this specific genre of cases.
*****
Lindsay M. Harris is an Immigration Staff
Attorney at the Tahirih Justice Center, a legal services
91

Experts, like all witnesses in immigration court, must
testify under oath or affirmation administered by the IJ. 8
C.F.R. § 1240.7(b).
92
See Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir.
2005) (finding an affidavit from a family member less probative in part because it was based on hearsay and the affiant was
not available to be subjected to cross-examination).
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the Ninth Circuit’s Court of Appeals, where she focused
on immigration and asylum law. She teaches Refugee
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SHOW YOUR STUFF!
Send us the decisions in your cases. Let everyone
know about your prowess.
Any reader interested in sharing information of
interest to the immigration bar, including notices
of upcoming seminars, newsworthy events, ‘‘war
stories,’’ copies of advisory opinions, or relevant
correspondence from the DHS, DOJ, DOL, or DOS
should direct this information to Daniel M.
Kowalski, dkowalski@thefowlerlawfirm.com., or
Ellen Flynn, Senior Legal Editor, Bender’s Immigration Bulletin, 121 Chanlon Rd., New Providence, NJ
07974, ellen.m.flynn@lexisnexis.com.
If you are interested in writing for the
BULLETIN, please contact Dan Kowalski via
e-mail at dkowalski@thefowlerlawfirm.com. We
welcome your contributions.
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IMMIGRATION
NEWS
(Continued from page 1809)
of the EOIR, and Laura Lichter, president of AILA, have
criticized the report. See more information at http://
www.lexisnexis.com/community/immigration-law/blogs/
inside/archive/2012/11/02/lichter-osuna-oig-critique-ofimmigration-courts-lacks-nuance.aspx, (Lichter, Osuna:
OIG Critique of Immigration Courts Lacks Nuance.)
Supreme Court — The U.S. Supreme Court heard
oral argument in No. 11-820, Roselva Chaidez v.
United States, on November 1. The question is
whether the holding in Padilla v. Kentucky, that an
attorney representing a noncitizen in a criminal case
must give proper advice about immigration consequences, applies retroactively. Jeffrey L. Fisher
argued for the petitioner, and Deputy Solicitor
General Michael R. Dreeben for the government. The
transcript is available in the United States Supreme
Court Transcripts database on lexis.com, at 2011
U.S. Trans. 41048.

REMINDER:
The correct citation form for the BIB is Author, Title,
17 Bender’s Immigr. Bull. 1811 (Nov. 15, 2012).

RESEARCH TIP:
You can easily ShepardizeTM BIA precedent
decisions on lexis.com.
Hit the ‘‘Shepard’s’’ tab at the top of your
document. If you are in a case, the citation of
that case will appear in the box. If you want to
check another case, type in that citation instead.
Then hit the ‘‘Check’’ button, and get your results!
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CASE
DIGESTS
FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
Court of Appeals:
Ali v. Holder, 686 F.3d 534, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS
14890 (8th Cir. July 20, 2012): An IJ’s denial of asylum
and withholding of removal were upheld where the
evidence established that the petitioner committed
fraud and willfully misrepresented his identity, and
his testimony before the immigration court was inconsistent, evasive, and unresponsive.
Yonis Ahmed Ali, also known as Hussain Isse
Mohamud, from Somalia, was placed in removal
proceedings after he disclosed during a naturalization
interview that he had used a false identity when he
entered as the spouse of a refugee. After so entering
in 1995, he became an LPR in 1996. Facing removal,
he applied for asylum and withholding of removal. He
claimed that he had two different names as a result of
being sent to live with an adoptive family as a child.
He conceded that he had misrepresented other facts and
made up stories during his naturalization interview.
Further, his testimony was marked by inconsistencies
and evasive and unresponsive answers. At the conclusion of the removal hearing, the IJ made an adverse
credibility finding and denied relief. The IJ ordered
removal upon finding that Ali had failed to rebut the
removal charges against him with credible evidence.
The BIA dismissed his appeal, and he sought judicial
review.
The court (Murphy, Melloy, Colloton) denied
review, finding that the record supported the IJ’s
adverse credibility determination and that Ali had
failed to rebut the charges of removability based on
his lack of a valid entry document and his willful misrepresentations as to several matters, including his
true identity.
NOTE: For more on this subject, see Charles
Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure
§ 34.02.
Borrome v. Att’y Gen., 687 F.3d 150, 2012 U.S.
App. LEXIS 14676 (3d Cir. July 18, 2012): A conviction under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for
wholesale distribution of prescription drugs without
a license is not for an aggravated-felony controlledsubstance-trafficking crime, and the applicable FDCA
provisions are not laws relating to a controlled
substance for immigration purposes.
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Ramone Borrome was a citizen of the Dominican
Republic who became an LPR in 1996. In 2002, the
Food and Drug Administration charged him and two
others with unlicensed wholesale distribution of
prescription drugs. Borrome was not charged under
the Controlled Substances Act. Following his conviction, he was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment.
Later, he was found to be removable as an alien
convicted of an aggravated felony and of a controlledsubstance offense. In ordering removal, the IJ determined that the offense was analogous to a CSA
conviction. The BIA affirmed, and Borrome filed for
judicial review.
The court (Scirica, Ambro, Van Antwerpen)
reversed the agency decision and vacated the order of
removal upon finding that he had not been convicted of
illicit trafficking in a controlled substance and that the
FDCA provisions were not laws relating to a controlled
substance.
NOTE: For more on this subject, see Charles
Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure
§§ 63.03, 71.05.
Matul-Hernandez v. Holder, 685 F.3d 707, 2012
U.S. App. LEXIS 14584 (8th Cir. July 17, 2012):
‘‘Guatemalans returning from the United States who
are perceived as wealthy’’ was not a cognizable social
group, for it would not be perceived as a determinable
social group by society or subject to a higher incidence
of crime than the rest of the population.
Julio Matul-Hernandez was a native of Guatemala
who illegally entered in 1993. As a teenager, he had
been forced into the Guatemalan army, had deserted,
and had lived in Mexico for several years before coming
to the United States. While in Mexico, he traveled often
to Guatemala. During one of his visits, he was threatened by three armed men in his father’s store. Charged
in removal proceedings, he applied for asylum and
withholding of removal. He testified that his brother
and uncle were victims of violent crime in Guatemala.
He argued that he would be persecuted in Guatemala if
removed because he was a member of a particular social
group: Guatemalans returning from the United States
who are perceived as wealthy. At the time of his
removal hearing, he owned a grocery store in Nebraska.
The IJ denied the relief sought, but granted voluntary
departure. The BIA dismissed an appeal, and MatulHernandez sought judicial review.
The court (Wollman, Colloton, Benton; opinion by
Wollman) denied his petition for review, finding that he
had failed to establish that he was a member of a ‘‘particular social group’’ targeted for persecution, as his
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proposed group would not be perceived as a determinable social group by society or subject to a higher
incidence of crime than the rest of the population.
NOTE: For more on this subject, see Charles
Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure
§ 33.04.
Dayo v. Holder, 687 F.3d 653, 2012 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14302 (5th Cir. July 12, 2012): Substantial
evidence, including inconsistent statements and lack
of corroborating evidence, supported the BIA’s determination that the petitioner was not credible and that
he failed to establish that his native country persecuted
asylum-seekers. But he could submit a new claim for
relief after the confidentiality of the original asylum
application was breached by the government.
Kingsley Dayo, a/k/a Kingsley Pedersoli, A Dayo
Kingsley, Kingsley Dayo Pedersoli, Kingsley J. Dayo,
and Darryl Lamont Gates, was a Nigerian facing
removal for illegal entry in 2004. Appearing before an
IJ in 2009, Dayo denied the allegation. The evidence
indicated that he had entered using someone else’s passport and birth certificate. The IJ ordered removal, and
Dayo applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and
CAT relief. The IJ denied the relief, finding that Dayo
was not credible and that his asylum application was
untimely. Following the BIA’s affirmance, a petition
for judicial review was dismissed in part and denied.
Dayo moved to reopen his removal proceedings
because the government, in the course of obtaining
travel documents from the Nigerian consulate to facilitate removal, inadvertently disclosed that he had
applied for asylum. The BIA thus reopened his proceedings and remanded to the IJ, allowing Dayo to submit a
new request for relief based on the breach of confidentiality. The IJ took further evidence with regard to the
breach of confidentiality and its consequences. The IJ
determined that he was not credible and that he had not
shown that the Nigerian government persecuted
asylum-seekers. The BIA affirmed, and Dayo sought
judicial review.
The court (Reavley, Smith, Prado; opinion by
Smith) denied the petition upon finding that, while
asylum-seekers may apply for separate relief based on
a breach of confidentiality, substantial evidence
supported the determination that he was not credible
and that he had failed to establish that the Nigerian
government persecuted asylum-seekers.
NOTE: For more on this subject, see Charles
Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure
§ 34.02.
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Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS
14223 (7th Cir. July 12, 2012): The beneficiary of an
I-864 affidavit of support, seeking its enforcement,
has no legal duty to mitigate damages by seeking
employment.

part of a suspect class, that any discrimination by
the state against them was subject to strict-scrutiny
review, and that the statute violated the plaintiffs’
equal protection rights and encroached upon the
federal government’s regulation of immigration.

Wenfang Liu was a native of China who married a
U.S. citizen. He executed an I-864 affidavit of support,
in which he agreed to provide her with whatever
support was necessary to maintain her at an income of
at least 125% of the federal poverty level. The parties
were subsequently divorced. Per the divorce court, the
ex-husband was required to provide monthly support to
Liu, exclusive of any support obligations pursuant to
the I-864. The divorce court’s support order included an
obligation on her part to seek work. She sued to enforce
his support obligation under the I-864. The district court
(Conley) held that she was not entitled to support
pursuant to the I-864 because she had not actively
sought employment during the period at issue. She
appealed.

NOTE: For more on this subject, see Charles
Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure
§§ 6.05, 9.03.

The court (Posner, Rovner, Wood; opinion by
Posner) reversed upon finding that the beneficiary had
no legal duty, by statute or regulation, to mitigate
damages.
NOTE: For more on this subject, see Charles
Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure
§ 63.05.
Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 2012 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14090 (2d Cir. July 10, 2012): A state law
limiting pharmacist licenses to citizens and LPRs was
unconstitutional.
New York state law provided that pharmacists’
licenses could be issued only to U.S. citizens and
LPRs. The statute excluded all other aliens from the
pharmacy profession, including those who had received
authorization from the federal government to work in
the United States temporarily. Twenty-six alien pharmacists with temporary authorization from the federal
government to work in the United States challenged
the constitutionality of the statute, alleging, inter alia,
violation of their equal protection rights and encroachment on the federal government’s exclusive power to
regulate immigration. The parties filed cross-motions
for summary judgment. The district court entered
summary judgment for the plaintiffs and enjoined the
state’s enforcement of the statute upon finding that it
was unconstitutional as applied to aliens admitted and
given the right to work pursuant to U.S. immigration
policy. The state defendants appealed.
The court (Wesley, Hall, Underhill; opinion by
Wesley) affirmed upon finding that the plaintiffs were

Mendoza v. United States, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS
15871, renumbered 13225 (3d Cir. June 28, 2012):
Nearly five-year delay in filing a petition for a writ
of error coram nobis barred the effort for such relief.
Mario Mendoza was a native of Ecuador who was
charged with mortgage fraud and entered a guilty plea.
Counsel did not advise him that, because his offense
was an aggravated felony, his conviction could result in
his removal. However, prior to his sentencing in
September 2006, he learned from his presentence investigative report that it could. He was sentenced to
probation and ordered to make restitution and cooperate
with immigration officials. He was ordered removed. In
June 2011, he filed a petition for a writ of error coram
nobis, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The
district court denied the petition upon finding that it
was filed after an unreasonable delay. Mendoza filed
a timely appeal.
The court (Ambro, Vanaskie, Aldisert; opinion by
Aldisert) affirmed upon finding that the unreasonable
delay in filing his error coram nobis petition blocked his
efforts to seek relief.
NOTE: For more on this subject, see Charles
Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure
§ 74.08.
District Court:
Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 106713 (D. Conn. July 31, 2012): The
Defense of Marriage Act, with its definitions of
‘‘marriage’’ and ‘‘spouse’’ bearing no rational relation
to the statute’s purported objectives of defending the
institution of heterosexual marriage, defending traditional notions of morality, protecting state sovereignty
and democratic self-governance, and preserving
scarce governmental resources, violates the equal
protection rights of homosexuals under the Fifth
Amendment.
The plaintiffs were homosexuals who were legally
married to individuals of the same sex in Connecticut,
Vermont, and New Hampshire. Their suit challenged
the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act.
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In particular, they alleged that the definitions of
‘‘marriage’’ and ‘‘spouse’’ in DOMA violated their
equal protection rights under the U.S. Constitution.
They claimed that the definitions excluded homosexual
couples legally married under state law from receiving recognition and benefits under the numerous
federal laws that relied on the DOMA definitions. The
plaintiffs had been denied federal marital benefits
or had sought to file federal income tax returns based
on their married status. The plaintiffs moved for
summary judgment, and the defendants moved to
dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a
claim.
The court (Bryant) granted the plaintiffs summary
judgment and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss
upon finding that homosexuals were a suspect class
whose claims were entitled to a heightened level of
judicial scrutiny and that DOMA, even under a more
deferential level of judicial scrutiny, did not bear a
rational relation to its stated objectives and therefore
violated the equal protection principles incorporated
in the Fifth Amendment.
NOTE: For more on this subject, see Charles
Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure
§§ 6.02, 36.02.

BIA DECISIONS
Precedent:
Matter of Sanchez-Herbert, 26 I. & N. Dec. 43
(BIA 2012): When an alien fails to appear for a
hearing because he has left the United States, termination of proceedings is not appropriate if he had
received proper notice of the hearing and was removable as charged.
DHS charged that Ramiro Sanchez-Herbert was
inadmissible for being an alien in the United States
without admission or parole. He appeared at a master
calendar hearing, conceded removability, then received
several continuances until February 2011, when
counsel appeared without him and moved to terminate
proceedings. Counsel presented evidence that SanchezHerbert had voluntarily returned to Mexico. DHS urged
a hearing in absentia, but the IJ granted termination on
the ground that she lacked jurisdiction once he left the
United States. DHS appealed.
The BIA (Malphrus, Creppy, Liebowitz; opinion by
Malphrus) sustained the appeal and reinstated the
proceedings. It explained that departure does not
remove jurisdiction, as long as the NTA has been properly filed with the court and seems to still apply. The
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BIA drew on the decision in Matter of Brown, 18 I. &
N. Dec. 324 (BIA 1982). It pointed out that the purpose
of in absentia proceedings is to see whether DHS can
show removability and proper notice. If it can, the IJ
should order removal, which provides consequences
that would not apply if the IJ only terminates proceedings—as though DHS had not shown notice or
removability.
NOTE: For more on this subject, see Charles
Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure
§§ 1.06, 64.03.
Matter of Davey, 26 I. & N. Dec. 37 (BIA 2012):
The term ‘‘single offense’’ in INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i)
refers to a single incident, not one statutory crime, so
that a guilty plea to possession of ten grams of marijuana and drug paraphernalia — the bag holding the
drug— did not provide multiple ‘‘offenses.’’
Jennifer Adassa Davey, a Jamaican, pleaded guilty
to possession of less than ten grams of marijuana in a
plastic baggie—possession of marijuana and of drug
paraphernalia in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes
§ 13-3405(A)(1) and 13-3415(A). In removal proceedings, an IJ ordered her released from detention on a
$2,000 bond. The IJ concluded that DHS was ‘‘substantially unlikely’’ to prove that her convictions supported
a charge under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)((i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The IJ reasoned that the conviction
was for ‘‘a single offense involving possession for one’s
own use’’ of no more than thirty grams of marijuana.
DHS appealed, arguing that under INA § 236(c)(1)(B),
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B), the IJ lacked jurisdiction to
redetermine her custody status.
The BIA (Cole, Pauley, Greer; opinion by Pauley),
posited two possible interpretations of ‘‘single offense’’:
a single generic crime, as DHS favored, and a single
incident, as Davey and the IJ preferred. Although the
BIA had not previously construed that language in
§ 237(a)(2)(B)(i), it had construed the term in INA
§ 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), and held that it refers to
a single event. The IJ had followed that case, Matter of
Martinez Espinoza. The BIA agreed, saying that the
statutory language requires a ‘‘circumstance-specific’’
inquiry along the lines described in Nijhawan v.
Holder, rather than ‘‘a focus on the formal elements
of generic offenses.’’ Then, turning to the facts of the
case, the BIA concluded that DHS indeed was substantially unlikely to meet its burden of proving that Davey
was not within the ‘‘personal use’’ exception. The BIA
pointed out that the bond order came after a removal
hearing and the dismissal of the § 237(a)(2)(B)(i)
charge on the merits.
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NOTE: For more on this subject, see Charles
Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure
§§ 63.03, 71.05.

AAO DECISIONS
Matter of X, file [no. not provided], (AAO Jan. 5,
2012) (Nebraska Service Center): A professor who
had received numerous awards, published a graduatelevel text and several prizewinning papers, and been
active in his field as a review panel and professional association participant, failed to satisfy at least
three of the regulatory criteria for extraordinaryability classification and otherwise failed to establish
the requisite national or international acclaim or
his position within the small percentage at the very
top of his field.
The petitioner, a professor at MIT and a research
scientist, sought classification as an alien of extraordinary ability in the sciences. He had published a
graduate-level text and several prizewinning papers,
had served on review panels, and was a member of
multiple professional associations. The petitioner also
had received multiple distinguished service and contribution awards. The director denied the petition, finding
that he had failed to establish the requisite national or
international acclaim. The petitioner appealed.
The AAO dismissed the appeal upon finding that
the petitioner had failed to satisfy at least three of the
regulatory criteria and, despite substantial achievement
in his chosen field, ultimately failed to meet the high
standard of national or international acclaim and a
position at the highest level of his field.
NOTE: For more on this subject, see Charles
Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure
§ 39.03.
Matter of X, file [no. not provided], (AAO Jan. 10,
2012) (Texas Service Center): A senior software
engineer who had received three lesser awards,
published one scholarly article with no documented
citations to it, played a critical role in one distinguished organization, and received above-average
but not extraordinary compensation for his work
failed to satisfy at least three of the regulatory criteria
for EB-1-1 classification and otherwise failed to establish the requisite national or international claim in
his chosen field.
The petitioner, a senior software engineer, sought
classification as an alien of extraordinary ability in the
sciences. He had received three lesser awards for his
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work, but he gave little or no documentation of their
national or international significance. The petitioner
also submitted the abstract of one article published
under his name, with no evidence of scholarly citations
to it, and evidence that he had played a critical role in
one organization of distinguished reputation in his field.
He submitted evidence of his compensation, but it was
not sufficiently high to reflect national or international
acclaim or a position at the top of his field. The director
denied the petition, finding that the petitioner had failed
to establish the requisite national or international
acclaim. The petitioner appealed.
The AAO dismissed the appeal upon finding that
the petitioner had failed to satisfy at least three of the
regulatory criteria and, despite significant achievement
in the field of software engineering, ultimately failed to
establish the requisite national or international acclaim
for his work.
NOTE: For more on this subject, see Charles
Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure
§ 39.03.
Matter of X, file [no. not provided], (AAO Jan. 11,
2012) (Nebraska Service Center): An educator and
activist in end-of-life choices, despite authorship, citations, recommendations, and a significant national
award nomination, failed to submit ‘‘extensive documentation’’ of his achievements, failed to satisfy at
least three of the regulatory criteria for extraordinary-ability classification, and otherwise failed to
establish the requisite national or international
acclaim or his position within the small percentage
at the very top of his field.
The petitioner, an educator and activist in end-oflife issues, sought classification as an alien of extraordinary ability. Evidence indicated that the petitioner had
been repeatedly nominated for a national award in
Australia, was the subject of numerous professional
publications, had authored three books and numerous
articles, had been cited by others, and was the subject of
numerous recommendations extolling his ability.
However, the director denied the petition, finding that
the petitioner had failed to establish extraordinary
ability or sustained national or international acclaim.
The petitioner appealed. On appeal, his counsel
claimed that he satisfied at least three of the regulatory
criteria for EB-1-1 classification.
The AAO dismissed the appeal upon finding that he
had failed to satisfy at least three of the regulatory
criteria, failed to submit the requisite ‘‘extensive documentation’’ of achievement, and otherwise failed to
establish the requisite national or international acclaim.
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NOTE: For more on this subject, see Charles
Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure
§ 39.03.
Matter of X, file [no. not provided], (AAO Jan. 11,
2012) (Nebraska Service Center): A motion seeking to
reopen administrative proceedings resulting in the
denial of a petition seeking classification as an alien
of extraordinary ability was dismissed where the petitioner failed to submit a statement regarding any
related judicial proceedings and, further, to submit
any new or previously unavailable evidence in
support of the motion to reopen.
The petitioner had sought classification as an alien
of extraordinary ability. The director denied the petition
in April 2008. On appeal, the AAO withdrew the director’s decision and remanded for further consideration.
The director certified his denial to the AAO in
November 2009. In April 2010, the AAO affirmed the
director’s adverse decision. The petitioner moved to
reopen the proceedings before the AAO. In filing the
motion, the petitioner failed to submit the required
statement indicating whether the validity of the decision
had been or was the subject of judicial proceedings. The
petitioner also resubmitted previous evidence in support
of the motion, but not new or previously unavailable
evidence.
The AAO dismissed the MTR and affirmed the
denial upon finding that the petitioner had failed to
meet one of the regulatory requirements for the filing
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of a motion and, on the merits, failed to identify the
regulatory criteria at issue and to submit ‘‘new’’
evidence in support of the motion to reopen.
NOTE: For more on this subject, see Charles
Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure
§§ 3.02, 39.03.
Matter of X, file [no. not provided], (AAO Jan. 13,
2012) (Nebraska Service Center): An appeal from a
service center director’s denial of a petition seeking
classification as an alien of extraordinary ability,
received by the service center thirty-five days after
the issuance of the director’s decision, was rejected
as untimely and returned to the director for consideration as a motion.
The petitioner sought classification as an alien of
extraordinary ability. The service center director’s decision denying the petition was issued on March 16,
2010. Although counsel dated the petitioner’s appeal
‘‘April 16, 2010,’’ it was not received by the service
center until April 20, 2010, thirty-five days after the
director’s decision was issued.
The AAO rejected the appeal from and returned the
matter to the director for consideration as a motion upon
finding that the appeal was untimely.
NOTE: For more on this subject, see Charles
Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure § 3.02.
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GOVERNMENT
DOCUMENTS
FEDERAL REGISTER
Final Rules
Department of Homeland Security, Office of the
Secretary; ‘‘Designation of Taiwan for the Visa
Waiver Program’’; Action: Final rule: On October 20,
2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, designated Taiwan for
participation in the Visa Waiver Program. This final
rule updates the list of countries designated for participation in the VWP by adding Taiwan. It took effect on
November 1, 2012. 77 Fed. Reg. 64,409 (Oct. 22,
2012).
Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs;
‘‘Repeal of Regulations on Marriages’’: Action: Final
rule. Pursuant to Executive Order 13563, the Bureau
repealed 22 C.F.R. Pt. 52, relating to the role of consulates in marriages, as outdated, duplicative, and
unnecessary. The rule was effective October 29, 2012.
77 Fed. Reg. 65,477 (Oct. 29, 2012).
Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets
Control; ‘‘Iranian Transactions Regulations’’; Action:
Final rule: The Treasury Department is changing the
heading of the Iranian Transactions Regulations to
the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations
(ITSR), amending the renamed ITSR, and reissuing
them in their entirety. Visas are discussed in 31
C.F.R. § 560.505. The final rule can be downloaded
from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-10-22/
pdf/2012-25770.pdf. It is effective as of October 22,
2012. 77 Fed. Reg. 64,664 (Oct. 22, 2012).

ICE MEMORANDUM


Enforcement Actions at or Focused on Sensitive
Locations

Editorial Summary: In this memo, dated October 24,
2011, ICE Director John Morton set forth ICE policy
regarding certain enforcement actions at or focused on
sensitive locations. The memo is available at http://
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www.ice.gov/doclib/publicadvocate/pdf/10029.2-po
licy.pdf and is reprinted at Appendix C.

USCIS DOCUMENTS


USCIS—AILA Meeting October 9, 2012

Editorial Summary: On October 9, 2012, USCIS
hosted an engagement with AILA representatives.
USCIS discussed issues related to waivers of inadmissibility, NSEERS, H-1B visa cap registration, the
Entrepreneurs in Residence Program, and other issues.
USCIS’s responses to AILA’s questions are reprinted at
Appendix D.


USCIS Field Operations—AILA Meeting on
October 4, 2012

Editorial Summary: On October 4, 2012, the
USCIS Field Operations Division hosted an engagement with AILA representatives. USCIS discussed
issues related to biometrics collection, NSEERS registration, customer service, and other issues. USCIS’s
responses to AILA’s questions are reprinted at
Appendix E.

DOL/ETA GUIDANCE


TEGL No. 9-12: Human Trafficking: The Role of
the Public Workforce System in the Delivery of
Services and Referrals to Victims of Trafficking

Editorial Summary: The Employment and Training
Administration released a Training and Employment
Guidance Letter on October 24, 2012, covering
human trafficking. The TEGL is reprinted at Appendix F
and is online at http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/
TEGL/TEGL_9_12.pdf.

STATE DEPARTMENT CABLE


B-1 in Lieu of H Cable

Editorial Summary: The State Department sent a
cable to all diplomatic and consular posts on October 12,
2012, regarding B-1 in Lieu of H-1B and H-3 guidance.
This cable supersedes the June 21, 2012 B-1 in Lieu of H
ALDAC that was published as Appendix C in the July 15,
2012 issue (17 Bender’s Immigr. Bull. 1427). The new
cable is reprinted at Appendix G.
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